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Abstract
Towards the end of 2016, President Mauricio Macri of Argentina announced that
he would be re-enacting a program of price controls that had been introduced by his
predecessor, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, called Precios Cuidados. However, this
time the list of items would contain a greater amount than the previous program, almost
400 more products than before, the variety of them falling under agricultural products.
This thesis looks to examine whether or not the implementation of a price control
program by President Macri, that has failed in the past, can be explained by the theory of
urban bias. After a discussion of the theory of urban bias and the problems surrounding
price controls, this thesis then goes to an examination of different governments in
Argentina and their attitudes towards the agricultural sector, along with examining
Argentina’s history with inflation and price controls. It then follows with an empirical
investigation which examines variables from an investigation done by Vanderbilt
University, along with examining the locations of the different companies to see whether
or not urban bias played a role in President Macri’s decision to implement this program.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
Overview
The government of a country has the ability to control which citizens are the
winners and losers in regards to which economic policy they implement. When inflation
is untamed and runs rampant on a country’s currency and economy, there are citizens
who are either extremely harmed or given an extreme advantage. When a country has had
a historically problematic relationship with hyperinflation, like Argentina, the consumers
who have been disadvantaged by high prices express their concerns for lower domestic
prices to the government through voting or even riots. In turn, the incumbent government
may concede to their requests for lower inflation by implementing the use of price
controls, specifically on agricultural goods, which would create a shift of the burden of
inflation from the consumers in the urban areas to the producers in the periphery, which
is what the past two governments of Argentina have done.
Typically, the farmers and producers who benefit from these high rates of
inflation are located in the rural areas of the country, like the Pampas region, where there
are vast plots of land; the people who are harmed by this are the consumers, which the
majority of them are located in the more urban, industrialized metropolitan areas of the
country, such as Buenos Aires, Córdoba Capital, and Rosario, which together hold almost
half of the population of the country. The rest of the population of Argentina is spread out
through an enormous expanse of land. This distinction between the urban and rural
coalitions is what will play a major role in this thesis.
Over the years, the Argentina government has attempted to control excessive
inflation through a variety of policies, but there is one that for some reason they keep
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returning to, and that is the policy of price controls. The reason that this is puzzling is
because it has been proven time and time again throughout history that price controls do
not work as a manner in which inflation can be controlled. They may work for a short
period of time, but are not ever a permanent solution, and in some cases may even cause
more damage than before. Even the United States has attempted to use price controls
after war periods and it has not worked, which is important because the United States is a
more developed country than Argentina, and if any country would have had success with
price controls, it would be the United States because of their dominance in both domestic
and international markets and how the government handled years of high inflation during
the Great Depression. 1
So the question arises as to why the current President of Argentina Mauricio
Macri, would implement a price control program that was created by his predecessor in
2013 and ultimately was repealed because it did not function properly. In this thesis, I
will argue that there is an ulterior motive to the re-implementation of this program, which
is that the use of price controls can be explained by the theory of urban bias. I argue that
there is an incentive to shift the burden of inflation from the metropolitan areas of the
country, most of which hold a majority of the support for the current government, to the
rural periphery, and that this shifting of costs of inflation to the rural producers has
caused them to become more concerned about inflation because they have come to bear
the brunt of the burden that is caused by inflation.
Although the results from the empirical analysis give an ambiguous answer as to
whether or not the use of price controls can be fully explained by the theory of urban
1 Rockoff, Hugh. Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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bias, it can be seen that in the rural areas there is a greater concern of inflation, which
combined with the historical analysis that I present can show that because of the policies
that the past two governments have enacted shifted away from the needs of the rural
agricultural producers, who historically have been supported by the government, to the
needs of the urban consumers, that a bias towards the urban coalition can be at least
partially explained by the theory of urban bias. However, the limitations to this thesis
which will be presented later, call for a deeper investigation into the shifting climate of
Argentine politics and economic policy.
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Chapter 2:
Theory of Price Controls
Price controls that are disproportionately targeted at agricultural goods are one of
the manners in which a government can enact urban bias on its rural constituents. Price
controls are a regulation put forward by the government that can establish either a price
ceiling or a price floor. A price ceiling, or maximum price, that is set below the price that
would prevail if the market was left unregulated, generally during episodes of inflation,
while a price floor sets the lowest legal price that a good can be sold at and prevents
governments from setting prices too low. If a price ceiling is set below the market price,
it can lead to a shortage, where demand of the controlled good is greater than the supply
available, which can have negative effects on the constituents. Shortages from price
ceilings can lead to the creation of black markets of a good, long lines of people waiting
for the product, or a reduction in quality of product by the producer. In this thesis we will
be discussing price ceilings, and why a government would choose to use them even with
the evident cost to society that price controls create.
There are different kinds of price controls that a government can enact depending
on what it is trying to accomplish. It can establish a price control in a single sector, where
the intention is not to drive down inflation but instead direct purchasing power away from
that market. Price controls can also be a mixture of measures that attempt to control the
general level of prices, but instead of relying on market forces, rely on moral persuasion
or other types of enforcement. The last kind, which will be the one studied, is a set of
temporary price controls that are administered over a large variety of goods and services.
It is this kind of price control that has the intention of curbing inflation.
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Inflation can be caused by a variety of factors within a nation’s economy, such as
a supply shock, an asset market boom, a belief of higher future prices—which causes
sellers to withhold product for hopes of greater profit, a rise in demand relative to supply,
or when an economic agent can avoid competitive pressures, drive up prices and restrict
supply, given that there are no close substitutes for the product. “Inflation, more than
depression, I regard as the clear and present economic danger of our times and one that is
potentially more destructive of the values and amenities of democratic life”.2 This quote
is important because it describes how something like inflation can dismantle a democratic
government, as we will see within Argentina’s history of riots during periods of high
inflation. The inflation hypothesis which can also be used to examine why price controls
are used in these specific times, follows that the use of price controls is explained by
changes in price level, and rising prices or the anticipation of a rise in price—inflation
aversion—can urge policymakers and politicians to either enact or raise the level of price
controls. However, this theory explains why years of high inflation tend to be associated
with high levels of price controls.3
There are a few, supposed, short-term benefits of enacting price controls. Many
advocates emphasize the direct effects they have on current prices.4 This is one of the
main reasons that they appear during times of inflation, because they allow for a
temporary stabilization of rising prices. Price controls have the ability to increase exports,
which increases a nation’s competitive advantage in foreign markets. However, with
price controls the producers willingness to sell may decrease since they would be

2 Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Theory of Price Control. 1952.
3 Jonung, Lars. The Political Economy of Price Controls: The Swedish Experience 1970-1987. 1990.
4 Rockoff, 2.
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receiving a lower price, and in turn would lead to a shortage, which would make it
unlikely that foreign demand would be met. Along with reducing inflation, there are other
purported benefits of price controls, although they are not supported by most economists
(which again proceeds to the question of why they would be used).
The costs of the price controls first must be measured in terms of costs of other
anti-inflationary policies, because one of the reasons they may be used is that they are the
option with the lowest cost to society. They may also be able to eliminate temporary
spikes in price and wage behavior, and even companies, whose product range is only
partially subjected to price controls, may compensate for the losses created by price
controls by raising the prices of products that have not been subjected to these price
controls, given that they are relatively inelastic.5 However, most literature follows that
price controls can only be in effect for a short period of time, because the longer they are
used, the harder it will be to gain acceptance among the employers and wage earners,
along with the government anticipation of excessive political costs. In reality, no desired
permanent effects can be anticipated from price controls. 6
Neoclassical economics follows the model that in a market that is perfectly
competitive, resources will be allocated efficiently, which means production depicts
consumer preferences, and neither the consumers nor the producers experience a
disadvantage from buying or producing. However, price controls are a way the
government can intervene in the market and block efficient allocation, and prevent the
market from allocating resources and goods in the most efficient manner. This is to give
an advantage to a certain group of consumers, and this is the main reason that price
5 Jonung, 154.
6 Ibid., 156.
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controls are questionable, because theoretically the most desirable state of an economy is
one that is perfectly competitive. Controls stop prices from producers responding
efficiently to demand, because false information about the state of the market is conveyed
through the controls—for example, if a farmer believes that the price of wheat is going to
decrease, it is not going to be planted because the farmer will plant something else that he
believes will be more profitable. Since cost and demand change frequently in the market,
any price that is fixed for an extended time will lack social efficiency and lose any gains
from trade that had been previously made, eventually resulting in a shortage of the
controlled goods.7 “Price control, un-supplemented by further measures to reduce the
demand in the particular market, can be applied to such markets only with the greatest
difficulty and at best with indifferent and temporary results”.8
Jan Herin identifies the main problems that arise when a government implements
price controls. The first problem is one that may occur even before the price controls are
introduced: many employers and employees in countries that routinely enact price
controls have learned to anticipate them, and therefore prices may increase even prior to
the implementation, causing even greater problems for consumers. As mentioned
previously, price controls impede the adjustment of prices and the function of the market,
which misconstrues prices for producers and may create a divergence between wages and
prices. Price controls may also create substantial economic costs since they present
problems concerning industrial and structural growth and change; it is difficult for a city

7 Jonung, 150.
8 See, Galbraith.
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to allocate resources efficiently towards industrialization and growth if the prices and
wages that are present in the market do not convey the true environment of it. 9
A decrease in industrial growth can also lead to a decrease in investment and
productivity as another consequence of price controls. This lack of growth may in turn
lead to a higher rate of inflation than prior to the controls once they have been withdrawn
since there is a possibility that there was no real economic growth during the period of
price controls, which is one of the major criticisms of the use of price controls to curb
inflation: it does not work, and most if not all success with price controls are only
temporary. 10 Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a democratic government will be able
to stay on course with economic policy; government controls are frequently combined
with an expansionary fiscal policy because expansionary fiscal policies have also been
used as an attempt to decrease inflation, and may be combined with a price freeze before
an election to gratify consumers to gain votes.11 However, this is a problem because the
price freeze eliminates regular warning signals of problems in an economy, and therefore
allows governments to apply a much more expansionary monetary policy than they
would have been able to, which in turn can lead to excessive inflation once the price
controls have been lifted. 12
The international experience of price controls has not been notably beneficial to
countries that have enacted them, for example when the United States attempted to use
price controls after different war time periods, specifically on the price of oil, and it led to
queues and shortages and there has been little empirical evidence gathered from studies
9 Ibid., 152.
10 See, Galbraith.
11 Jonung, 153
12 Ibid., 152.
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that has suggested that price controls could permanently lower the rate of inflation. 13 So
the question arises of what politicians stand to gain from using them. First and foremost,
price controls can be enacted almost immediately, which gives citizens the idea that the
government is at least trying to improve the economy—for many countries that do not
have full confidence in their government, action towards fixing a problem is extremely
important to keep a popular opinion of the incumbent political party, which can be
observed, for example, through elections of different representatives in the United States.
If the citizens of a democratic country do not believe their representative is fixing the
problems that they believe are important, they will be voted out of office.
However, in Argentina, a country that has one of the highest urban populations of
big countries in the world at 92%, it is important that the urban consumers are kept
satisfied, because they are the ones who in the recent past have had the most control over
the government because of their sheer immensity, which can be seen for example by their
ability to revolt and vote out Presidents, as they did five times between 2001-2002
because of the hyperinflation the country had been experiencing. 14 Therefore, the process
of enacting price controls at different times over the past decade satisfies the urban
consumers need of cheap food while shifting the brunt of the burden of inflation to the
rural producers, which could therefore make them more concerned about inflation since
the needs of the urban coalition have been addressed first in the past decade. Controls are
also “cheap” in a sense, to introduce, and are a quick reaction from public pressures to
take some kind of action, which follows from the election hypothesis that states voters

13 See, Rockoff.
14 "The Argentine Crisis 2001/2002." Rabobank. August 23, 2013. https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/theargentine-crisis-20012002-/.
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gauge the performance of the government on the current economic situation; so,
introducing price controls and immediately lowering prices could convince voters that the
economic situation is improving.
Controls also shift an immense amount of political power to the ruling party, and
many times are used to reach an alternative goal of setting a political process in motion.
15

The party could use these price controls to respond to special interest groups by

providing privileges or exemptions—this creates winners and losers from price controls
that plays an extremely important role in the argument that will be presented in this
thesis. These winners and losers are created by the shift of the burden of inflation enacted
by the government; it is important to note that although the government would rather not
create losers, it is one of the consequences of creating winners that can support the
government.
It can be difficult to discern who, if anyone, wins from price controls because it
depends on the institutional factors that affect a particular market, and the effects that
price controls have on income can effect different groups of consumers and producers.
However, there are groups of people who are at a greater disadvantage through the
implementation of price controls. Price controls allow for the creation of a higher amount
of return on revenue for a particular industry that is favored by the government, and also
is a strategy for resource mobilization, which allows companies to secure new resources
for their organization more quickly than others. This, in turn, has the possibility of giving
an advantage to the constituents of the ruling party, if these constituents are businesses
who do not produce anything that is placed under price controls.

15 Jonung, 155.
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According to the neoclassical model, prices and wages of goods normally rise in
response to a demand of a good that is greater than the supply available, and historically,
consumers pay higher prices for certain goods because many consumers would rather
have the good than be without it. However, price controls freeze the price at a certain
rate, which in turn gives an advantage to the consumers and harms the producers. Even
though there is a short-term gain for purchasers, there is ultimately a decline in output
from the producers since they are not receiving a fair price for their good, which
eventually ends up harming the consumers as well because they will face shortages.
When price controls are enacted to benefit the consumers, however, it is the producers
who are harmed the most because they are not receiving a fair market price for their
product, and in turn become the group that is most disadvantaged. There are two different
manners in which companies and producers can be affected by price controls. On one
side, there are companies who would have prices that would have exceeded those of the
price control. This would obviously have an impact on the revenue of the company, but
the degree of impact would depend on the difference between the prices, the period of
time the controls were in place, and the ability of the company to adjust to the price
controls. The other side contains companies whose pries would have been lower than the
maximum price, so in reality these firms are given an advantage for a short period of time
from the price controls. 16
In the governments of many developed countries, a distinct bias to the rural areas
is present in the way that the government is arranged. For example, in the United States
the Senate has two senators per state, regardless of population. While the House of

16 Jonung, 1.
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Representatives is formed in a way that more accurately represents the populations of
each state according to size, the Senate allows the smaller states or the states with a
smaller population a greater advantage over the states with larger populations. Included
in this bias towards smaller states is that many of these states do not have a heavily
populated urban center and much of the revenue for that state comes from agriculture.
Therefore, in order to protect the interests of these agriculture based states, the Senate
allocates two members per state with the same amount of power, so that the interests of
the smaller and less populated states are not overtaken or overshadowed by the more
urbanized and heavily populated states—Montana and New York, for example.
In some developing countries there is not a rural bias present, but rather an urban
bias. Many developing countries have a certain set of characteristics that separate them
from developed countries, such as a low per capita income, high poverty levels, but the
most important one being an economy that is predominantly focused on agriculture and is
in transition to an economy focused on industrialization.17 The theory of urban bias
would explain why in countries with these characteristics and such a historically powerful
agricultural sector there is an incentive of the government to protect the urban dwellers
that do not work in agriculture, especially when there is a high percentage of urban
commoners that direct the flow of votes in a democratic government, because of the level
of importance that has been placed on the agricultural producers in the past that has
allowed them to charge higher prices for their goods in order to compete in the global
market and create a stronger economy for the country, which in turn harmed the pockets
of the domestic consumers. In a country like Argentina that currently has a high urban

17 Kumara. "Major Characteristics of Developing Countries." http://web.uvic.ca/~kumara/econ420/characteristics-dev.pdf.
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population in direct contrast to its historically rural population, the theory of urban bias
could help explain why President Macri has enacted price controls. In this next section I
will explain the theory of urban bias to further explain how it may help explain why
President Macri has chosen to enact price controls.

13

Chapter 3:
Theory of Urban Bias
Michael Lipton, a British economist who specializes in rural poverty in
developing countries, first introduced the theory of urban bias in 1977. Although Lipton
coined the name of the theory of “urban bias” in the 1970s, the decision of where
resources would be best allocated in a country attempting to industrialize has been a
question for the past 100 years. In the 1920s, policymakers in the Soviet Union how to
modernize and industrialize within planned economic development, which raised the
issue of a sectoral balance between urban and rural, and how to best divide rural
economic product for urbanization and industrialization. 18
The idea of urban bias gained prominence in the 1980s for two reasons: first, it
became an economic development sub-theory that explained slowed growth and high
rates of poverty in developing countries, and secondly because the World Bank and other
bi-lateral agencies who produced numerous reports on urban bias and urban development
in this time period strongly reacted to Lipton’s theory because it was an attempt that
helped argue the theory that agricultural prices in the third world were highly “distorted”
because of urban-dominated politics in these countries. 19
The theory of urban bias attempts to answer the question as to why growth and
development in poorer developing countries have failed to improve the welfare of its
poorest citizens, not in a rich versus poor context but rather urban versus rural.
“The most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today
is not between labor and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national
interests. It is between rural classes and urban classes.the rural sector
18 Pugh, Cedric. "‘Urban Bias’, the Political Economy of Development and Urban Policies for Developing Countries." Urban Studies 33, no.
7 (1996): 1045-060. doi:10.1080/00420989650011492.
19 Varshney, Ashutosh. "Introduction: Urban Bias in perspective." Journal of Development Studies 29, no. 4 (1993): 3-22. doi
10.1080/00220389308422293.5.
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contains most of the poverty and most of the low-cost sources of potential
advance; but the urban sector contains most of the articulateness,
organization, and power. So the urban classes have been able to win most
of the rounds of the struggle with the countryside”. 20
He states that development is “unjust and inefficient” because it is constructed for the
citizens in the urban areas who receive a larger portion of national resources, thereby
depriving the rural areas that contain a large share of poor constituents of much needed
revenue. 21 He argues that industrialization in poor countries was stimulated by artificial
resource transfers from the rural villages to urban cities since they were not seen as a
potential source of economic progress, and that governments accommodate resources to
towns and cities rather than villages because the citizens in urban areas have more
political power to convince governments to push policy towards their interests. 22
Following this argument, he describes that poor people in rural areas are
disadvantaged in areas of technology, health, education, nutrition, and access to financial
services caused by the disproportionate share of public spending urban areas receive and
policies centered on maintaining low prices of goods on products from rural areas, such
as food, and higher prices on goods and services produced in the urban sector. 23 Urban
bias often leads to significant food subsidies for the urban poor, which is usually at the
expense of rural agricultural producers who are subjected to selling their products at
lower than market prices as a result of the ability of the government to interfere in the
market. In a study done in Peru, urban bias was present in the subsidization of food for
urban consumers, that had been produced in rural areas, to make it cheaper for them to
buy. This left a heavy burden of production on the rural consumers and is an example of a
20 See Varshney.
21 Lipton, M. 1977. Why poor people stay poor: a study of urban bias in world development. Temple Smith London.
22 See Lipton.
23 Ibid.
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direct transfer of wealth from rural to urban citizens, because instead of the producers
receiving the full price for their goods, they were receiving a much lower domestic profit.
24

Artificially low prices on food are specifically aimed at aiding the interests of the urban

consumers who are not involved in the production or growing of food.
The theory then states that the comparison within the economic history of
industrialized countries is misleading, because the gap between rural and urban wealth
was much greater in poor countries than it was in rich countries during their respective
industrialization periods; he states that development usually requires industrialization, but
both of these processes are delayed when countries either attempt to industrialize too
quickly, too early, or try to do so through taking resources from rural areas and reallocating them to urban areas. 25 Overall, the theory of urban bias brings forward two
main propositions: first, that the process of development is systematically biased against
the countryside, and secondly, since these countries are controlled by the urban groups,
this bias is profoundly inserted in the political structure of these countries: “the
countryside is economically poor because it is politically powerless”. 26
There have been certain critiques pertaining to Lipton’s theory and its
shortcomings. The first critique of urban bias is that it neglects political institutions.
Lipton’s initial research focuses specifically on India and its government, so it may be
possible that the urban bias theory cannot explain actions across different political
systems, such as a democratic institution versus an authoritarian one; there lies a
difference in how well a single candidate electoral system could represent rural interests
24 Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. "Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default." International Organization 70, no. 02
(2016): 313-46. doi:10.1017/s0020818315000363.
25 See Lipton.
26 Varshney, 2.
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and how a multiple candidate system could. The different ideological orientations of the
ruling elite and whether they are pro-rural or pro-industrial could also play a role in
determining whether or not urban bias can explain the actions of the ruling party. Autosh
Varshney believes that this neglect of political institutions is the single most important
criticism of Lipton’s theory; he believes the continuation or existence of urban bias may
depend on the nature of the political institutions present in a country. One country may
have a state-centered focus and create agencies that attempt to contain the power of proagricultural institutions, such as the Finance Ministry in India, while others may have a
particular rural bias, similar to the United States. 27 This also demonstrates how different
political institutions, autocratic or democratic, may react towards the agricultural sector.
Along with the difference in political institutions, Lipton also only describes how
rural interests are defined in the political realm in an economic sense. He looks at rural
constituents as just that: rural. He does not include the possibility that ethnic and religious
identities may create cohesion between the urban and rural and therefore obstruct rural
interests instead of a bias towards the urban residents. 28 He solely focuses on economic
outcomes for the countryside, and from there concludes that the unfavorable economic
outcomes were due to the lack of power of the rural citizens. 29
Lipton also failed to realize that technical change over time could make the
agricultural sector more powerful than the period before industrialization. As economies
develop and modernize, the dependence on agriculture declines, and during the
industrialization of an agricultural society resources are going to be transferred to the
developing urban sector. In fact, Varshney alludes to the notion that the agricultural and
27 Varshney, 17.
28 Varshney, 5.
29 Ibid., 15.
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industrial sectors are linked because the agricultural sector creates the resources for
industrialization. The rural agricultural sector is the resource for food for the increasing
urban population, provides labor for the growing industrial workforce, and it produces
savings to finance industrial investment. This is an example of transferring resources
from the agricultural sector to industrial, not squeezing them. The former helps both
industries, while the latter hurts both. 30
The final criticism lies in the difficulties that arise in differentiating urban and
rural boundaries, which have begun to overlap since Lipton first produced his theory.
Because the size in villages and cities that may have once been subjected to urban bias
has increased, many of these villages are no longer subjected to urban bias but rather
have urbanized, or may have created strong bonds between urban consumers and rural
producers to where the peripheral producers have gained an advantage in the cities.
Varshney uses the example of the Ivory Coast, where an urban based association may
lobby for a rural project due to a previous linkage of the two. Changes in population and
growth in types of businesses may also be a cause in the blurred line between urban and
rural.
Through an examination of the theory behind price controls and why they are
historically unsuccessful along with an introduction to the theory of urban bias, we can
make a few conclusions. First, that price controls are not viewed as a legitimate approach
to combat inflation, and that any time they have been used to combat inflation, they have
almost always failed, even if they have been a temporary fix. Price controls distort market
prices, disadvantage producers, and can even create higher inflation. The theory of urban

30 Ibid., 7.
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bias was also introduced as a different way to view why politicians make certain
economic decisions, and is opposite of the rural bias that is present in countries like the
United States; governments make economic policy decisions that favor their constituents
in urban, metropolitan areas, for a number of reasons. By using what we have so far
observed from these two theories and discussing the history of the Argentine agricultural
sector and government, I will combine them in order to test whether or not the use of
price controls in Argentina by President Macri can be explained by the theory of urban
bias.
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Ch 4:
The Beginning of an Industry
The Beginning of Agriculture in Argentina
In this section, I will give a brief history of the politics behind the agricultural
sector in Argentina to demonstrate a few things. First, I will illustrate the dominance that
the agricultural belt has retained in the economy since the country’s birth. Second, I will
show the different political divisions within the recent history of the country and the the
beginning of a bias towards the urban areas under Peronism, with the exception of
Menem, and how this affected the rural areas. Finally, it will be important to see the
impact that the rural sector had in bringing the economy back to somewhat of its former
state after the crisis of 2001, and how this was the last time producers would be favored
from an economic standpoint, because Nestor Kirchner brought about a new state of
Peronism—called Kirchnerism—that greatly changed the favoritism and rural bias that
the industry of agriculture had so long enjoyed in the country.
Although the current and past two Presidential regimes of Argentina have not
been particularly beneficial to the country’s farmers and rural producers, there has not
always been such an inclination towards the urban constituents. The expansion of
agriculture has been more or less continuous since 1890, when the country was a magnet
for European immigrants. 31 These immigrants arrived in bulk to work on the land in the
fertile Pampas region where cattle and agricultural crops were driving the expansion and
power of Argentina. 32 Between 1900 and 1916, the development of railways allowed
31 Cooney, Paul. "Argentina's Quarter Century Experiment with Neoliberalism: From Dictatorship to Depression." Revista De Economia
Contemporánea 11, no. 1 (2007): 7-37. doi:10.1590/S1415-98482007000100001 .
32 "A century of decline." The Economist. February 17, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21596582-one-hundred-years-agoargentina-was-future-what-went-wrong-century-decline.
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Argentina to begin exporting its beef on an extraordinary scale; during these years,
exports of frozen Argentine beef grew from 26,000 tons per year to 411,000 tons per
year, which was the beginning of the dependency on agriculture and exports that the
country still—to an extent—observes today. 33
Before the outbreak of World War I, Argentina recognized the benefits of
globalization and free trade, and took advantage of them through the export of beef.
However, this dependence on agricultural exports was halted due to the implementation
of import protection policies, tariffs, and trade blockages during and after the war. 34 The
rise of Juan Perón was also the rise of a political party whose interests were not aligned
with the producers, but rather with those of the consumers and those affected by high
domestic prices, a pattern that has continued in the recent history of Argentina’s
government and its economic policies. Even with the limitations imposed on the
agricultural sector under Perón, between 1960 and 1985 the use of land for agriculture
had increased by 30%, productivity on this land had increased twofold, and the labor
force had increased by almost 4 times as much. 35
The Military Junta
This increase in land for farming and productivity in the agricultural sector did
not come without a cost. In 1976, a military coup overthrew the incumbent President at
the time, Isabel Perón, and from this year until 1985 installed a ruthless military
dictatorship with the intention of ridding the country of Peronism and re-designing the
economic structure of the country.
33 See, “A Century of Decline.”
34 Bailey, Tom. "A history of economic trouble in Argentina." World Finance. March 10, 2016. http://www.worldfinance.com/specialreports/a-history-of-economic-trouble-in-argentina.

35 See, “A Century of Decline.”
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The junta intended to shift support away from manufacturing industry and
towards agro-industry. They argued that the rent from agriculture, primarily beef
and grains, was no longer going to be used as a subsidy for industry, but rather
for the development of other value-added agro-industry. There are three key
factors which explain this approach by the junta. One represented a shift toward
agro-industry as opposed to industrial manufacturing. The junta was being more
supportive of the landowning oligarchy as opposed to the manufacturing
industry. 36

This is important because it was the one of the first times since before the reign of Perón
that the agricultural producers were once again given predominance in the economy and
were not hindered by tariffs or taxes; this inclination towards a free market economy was
a glimpse into the past of the free market economy that Argentina had adopted before the
first World War. Traditionally, exporters promote trade liberalization, and industrialists
and workers in the metropolitan areas support import substitution and protectionism
policies. 37 Therefore, this trade liberalization favored the rural producers over the urban
constituents.
The rural bias that was present in the economic stance of the military government
was also seen in their alliances with certain groups and the restructuring of certain areas
of the legislature. The government aligned itself more with the Argentinian Rural Society
(Sociedad Rural Argentina, SRA), instead of the Industrial Union of Argentina (Unión
Industrial de Argentina, UIA). The former represented the landowning oligarchy, while
the latter represented the industrialists of the country. 38 In 1983, the military junta also
increased the number of seats in the Diputado (Argentine version of the U.S. House of
Representatives) from three seats to five, which gave over-representation to the periphery

36 See Cooney.
37 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto. "Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a
Survey Experiment." International Organization 67, no. 02 (2013): 411-37. doi:10.1017/s0020818313000076. 417.
38 See Cooney.
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and rural provinces. Up until 1994, the presidents were chosen by an electoral college
where the rural constituents were overrepresented. 39
Peronism Under Menem
After the end of military rule, there was a “strong and irresoluble urban/rural
cleavage” that many thought would yield back to the high levels of protectionism of the
urban citizens seen before the war. 40 With the election of Carlos Menem in 1989, a
Peronist, it was conceivable that rural producers would lose their advantage in the
economy, given his political stance and the Peronist party’s historical attitude toward free
markets and exports. Despite his party affiliation, the adjustment to a free trade market
was continued under Menem; he broke with traditional Peronist views and was
committed to an economy with a base in agro-industry that sacrificed manufacturing. 41
This means that instead of the urban bias normally seen under Peronist governments, the
rural bias created under the military junta continued under Menem.
Different aspects of Menem’s presidency demonstrate a rural bias, specifically the
restructure of the public sector and federal spending. Under Menem, the national public
sector was reassembled without any costs being shared to the provincial sectors; this
means that all of the costs related to the reorganization of the national public sector were
shifted directly to the urban areas and away from the rural areas. Therefore, all of the
early aggregate costs of state reform were dispensed to areas where most of the national
public sector employees were located: the urban areas of the metropolis. 42 Along with
the monetary costs of restructuring, there were also costs in the manufacturing
39 Gibson, Edward, and Ernesto Calvo. Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of Economic Reform in
Argentina. Master's thesis, Northwestern University, 2000. Studies in Comparative International Development.
40 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto, 416.
41 See Cooney.
42 Gibson, Edward, and Ernesto Calvo, 13.
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employment sector due to the privatization of national companies. There were more than
110,000 jobs lost due to privatization, along with a loss of 33.9% loss in total
manufacturing employment between 1991 and 2001. Manufacturing as a share of GDP
also decreased from 30.9% in 1989 to 17.1% in 1998. 43 These numbers alone show the
priority that agricultural jobs were given during this time period.
The other manner in which the periphery was given preference under Menem was
through federal spending. While the data on federal spending shows that a greater amount
of transfers were given to urban areas in absolute terms in comparison to the transfers
given to the rural areas, the periphery was highly favored in federal redistributive
scenarios where the government re-organized how money would be spent in different
regions of the country. The government also spent an average of three times more in the
periphery than in the metropolitan areas, and the political impact that this spending had
was magnified by the lower cost in votes that were required to elect members of
Congress in the periphery. 44 All of these factors are important in the relationship to the
rural constituents because he had a control and bias towards the periphery that was not
usually included in the Peronist or Justicialista political parties. Not only was it out of
character for the parties, but it was also one of the last times in the history of the
Argentine government after the economic crisis of 2001 that different types of tariffs or
taxes enacted by the government did not hinder rural producers.

43 See Cooney.
44 Gibson, Edward, and Ernesto Calvo, 19.
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The 2001 Financial Crisis
The Argentine economic crisis of 2001 was the failure of the Argentine
government to pay its creditors a total of $95 billion, which was one of the the biggest
defaults in history, was started by the he austerity measures of President Menem in 1995,
which included pegging the Argentine currency, the peso, to the dollar. Although this
measure worked for a short period of time, pegging the peso to the dollar overshot the
desired appreciation value, which caused catastrophic effects on argentine exports, which
were predominantly agricultural. By the late 1990s Argentina had entered into a deep
recession, which resulted from a combination of the peg, a rise in state spending, and a
diminished revenue base. 45 By 1999 creditors lost confidence in the ability of the
Argentine banks to service their debts, which appreciated Argentine bonds and resulted in
austerity cuts at the request of the International Monetary Fund. The defaulting of debts
and disposal of the currency peg only advanced Argentina’s recession and the following
three-fold currency devaluation further impoverished Argentine citizens. 46
Following in 2001, a complete economic crash took effect, creating a major
income shock to the Argentine population.
“The country’s GDP shrank by 11% within a year. Unemployment increased
from 16.5 to 21.5% and the percentage of people below the poverty line grew
from 38 to 58% over the same period. A 200% currency devaluation and 41%
inflation in 2002 significantly reduced the purchasing power of the vast majority
of the population, forcing households to spend larger fractions of their income on
basic services.” 47

However, this devaluation of the peso meant that Argentine agricultural exports were
cheaper during a time that global prices were high: the devalued peso gave Argentine

45 See Bailey
46 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto, 418.
47 Bril-Mascarenhas, T. & Post, A.E. St Comp Int Dev (2015) 50: 98.
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products an advantage in international markets. The only way that Argentina was able to
create capital again after this default was through its agricultural exports. 48 In fact, much
of the turnover of the country’s economy was derived from the profits from the export
sector. The successful agricultural industry from 2004-2005 created sufficient revenue
that enabled the country to pay off $9.5 billion of foreign debt. 49 While this devalued
peso was beneficial for many producers in Argentina, much of the revenue was derived
from heavy export taxes to the government, and also created a dependency on agricultural
goods, similar to the dependency before the first World War.
A Change in Pace
Nestor Kirchner, who became President of Argentina in 2003, was what could be
called a “true” Peronist and described Menem’s bias towards the rural areas and his
economic policy of restructuring a “traitor” to Peronism. Kirchner wanted to rebuild the
industrial base of Argentina, its public works and services programs, and renegotiate the
operation of public services that had been privatized by Menem. In other words, Kirchner
was focused more on helping the urban constituents, whether they be poor or rich, and
wanted to decrease the focus on agriculture and increase the focus on industrialization,
which can be seen through his Superpoderes program, which fundamentally allowed him
to funnel discrete government resources to sectors that supported him most, such as urban
works and infrastructure projects, with none of the money going towards the agricultural
sector.

48 Deese, William, and John Reeder. "Export Taxes on Agricultural Products: Recent History and Economic Modeling of Soybean Export
Taxes in Argentina." Journal of International Commerce and Economics, September 2007. September 2007.
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/export_taxes_model_soybeans.pdf. 10.
49 Wise, Carol. Unexpected outcomes: how emerging economies survived the global financial crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2015. 160.
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After the crisis, the sharp increase of price in the 2000s positively affected
Argentina’s terms of trade, which allowed the agricultural sector to help pay off some of
the lingering foreign debt, as described previously. 50 However, 2/3 of the exports were
primary products or manufactured goods of primary origin whose prices went up, while
most of the imports were industrial and intermediate capital goods that experienced a
decline in prices. This meant that the protection of import competing firms that were
mainly centered in the urban areas were not beneficial to the economy, and the high
prices of agricultural goods were hurting the Argentine consumers, especially in the
urban areas.
Business on the international market for Argentina agricultural goods was doing
so well that many times, to gain more profit, Argentine local producers began selling less
of their products to the domestic economy, which in turn led to shortages, principally in
the major cities. These favorable terms of trade—which is a measure of how much of an
import an economy can get for a unit of an exported good—and incentive to export
agriculture caused a rise in domestic prices of food; the positive relationship between
trade, openness, and prices was soon reversed when food prices began increasing faster
than the inflation rate. In 2006, this reversal caused Kirchner to impose export bans on
producers so that the domestic supply would maintain a steady rate and price. 51 The
rising price of food, especially beef, became an extremely important political issue.
These export restrictions on farmers began the conflict between Kirchner and the
agricultural sector and the reversal of agricultural dominance. March of 2006 was the first
public conflict between Kirchner and the agricultural producers concerning the domestic
50 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto, 415.
51 Eiss, Donald W. National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Washington D.C.: Office of the United States Trade
Representative. 2006.
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prices of food: “we want the price of beef to come down, but we want it to come down
due to the consciousness and responsibility of the producing and processing sectors, and
we do not want them to subject the domestic price of beef to that of exports”. 52 Not soon
after this confrontation he placed a temporary ban on the nation’s largest export: beef.
Because of this, farmers lost revenue in waves because they were unable to sell beef at
higher prices abroad and were forced to sell beef only at the low, domestic prices. Two
months into the provisional ban, the agricultural sector demanded the government lift the
ban or it would protest violently. Although the ban was lifted, the government placed
even higher taxes on agricultural exports.
Kirchner believed this method of taxation on the agro-industry was helpful to the
economy because high taxes on household goods such as bread, milk, and beef would
hinder farmers from exporting too much, and therefore keep a steady local supply on the
market. To an extent, Kirchner was correct; these taxes were a significant part of
government revenue, because agriculture and agriculture related products composed
almost 50% of Argentina’s exports at this time. 53
Although Argentine farmers switched their major production from beef and wheat
to soybean and sunflower seeds, the “perverse effects of government intervention have
been amply demonstrated in the Kirchner era”. 54 According to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, in 2006 Argentina was the world’s fourth largest producer of wheat; by
2013, it had dropped to tenth place. It became too expensive for farmers to grow and sell
wheat because they were unable to compete in the international markets. In turn,
52 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto, 417.
53 Simoes, Alexander. "Products exported by Argentina (2008)." The Observatory of Economic Complexity.
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/arg/all/show/2008/.
54 Hendrix, Cullen, Stephen Haggard, and Beatriz Magaloni. Grievance and opportunity: Food prices, political regime, and protest.
https://cshendrix.files.wordpress.com/2007/03/hh_foodpricesprotest_forweb.pdf.
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Kirchner took the opposite approach that Menem did and sacrificed the agricultural and
rural sector for the needs of the urban and industrial sectors, a pattern that set the tone for
the two following administrations and gave way to their own economic programs that
benefitted the urban dwellers. This is one of the manners in which the shifting of the
burden of inflation and the importance of the urban consumers can be seen in recent
political history, and gives an idea as to who may be more concerned with high
inflationary prices. If the President says publicly that he does not want the urban
consumers to be subjected to high prices, the rural periphery becomes aware that their
needs are not as important to the political environment and may become more concerned
about inflation than before, and their fears may be confirmed through subsequent actions
taken by the President to aid the urban consumers, such as the subjection of farmers to a
continuous tax on agricultural goods and a loss in predominance in world markets.
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Chapter 5:
Argentina and a History of Price Controls
Inflation in Argentina
The citizens of Argentina are no strangers to the pitfalls of inflation. The entire
country has been on a rollercoaster of inflation, hyperinflation, or a normal rate of
inflation since the end of the second World War. This, in turn, caused inflation to be one
of the leading problems in Argentina, both economically and politically. Each new
President is given the task of figuring out a different way to rid the country of the
rampant inflation that has plagued it for years, but for some reason they keep returning to
price controls. “In Latin America, inflation is the most important determinant of public
opinion”; it can lead to coups of governments, riots, protests, and lack of critical
constituent support for re-election. 55
The biggest issue that the Argentine—and most other governments that face the
problem of inflation—government faces is the tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment, as can be seen on the Phillip’s curve that was discussed earlier in this
paper. However, after 1945 and Perón’s rise to power, his combination of state
intervention, redistribution of income based on increased wages, and industrial
protectionism were the basis for the beginning of the unbridled inflation that would
become an epidemic and would set the tone for what was more important to the citizens
of Argentina. Between 1945 and 1990, the country experienced different levels of
inflation and hyperinflation, during which time the worst level was from March 1989 to
March 1990, with an inflation rate of over 20,000%. 56

55 Kaplan, Stephen B. Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013. Print. 256.
56 Parker. "Money and Inflation in Argentina Case." Reed College. http://www.reed.edu/economics/parker/f10/201/cases/argentina.html.
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In order to curb inflation, the government under Carlos Menem created the
convertibility plan where one peso was equal to one American dollar, and that each peso
in circulation must be backed by the central bank with an equivalent amount of gold or
foreign currency. This was one of the only plans in recent history of the government that
did not include price controls to curb inflation, and to an extent it worked: “Inflation fell
from 1,344 percent in 1990 to 84 percent in 1991, 17.5 percent in 1992, 7.4 percent in
1993, 3.9 percent in 1994, 1.6 percent in 1995 and 0 percent in the twelve-month period
between June 1995 and June 1996”. 57
However, the economic crisis of 2001 demonstrated that there were more
problems inside of the Argentine economy than were visible to the public, and inflation
surged again in 2002. While the recent history of Argentina’s inflation will be discussed
later in this section, it is more important to first discuss the implications that these periods
of inflation and hyperinflation had and continue to have on the Argentine constituency.
This turbulent history of inflation has caused many of its citizens to become extremely
inflation averse.
Inflation aversion is how and individual assesses the relative costs and benefits of
inflation and unemployment. Obviously, individuals dislike unemployment, inflation, and
low growth, but not all of these can be obtained at the same time. With the historically
high rates of inflation, according to a poll 90% of Argentines perceived the rate of
inflation as increasing when the inflation rate reached 10%. 58 As prices increase more
rapidly, rising and volatile inflation becomes more costly to the incumbent government
and the public places a greater emphasis on it. For example, in the early 2000s in
57 See Parker.
58 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto 417.
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Argentina during hyperinflation, prices started rising faster than stores would keep up
with, and by the time a person would reach the end of the checkout line, the price would
have risen by five or ten pesos in a matter of minutes.
History also plays a role in expectations. Countries that have experienced
significant periods of inflation are generally more inflation averse and are more
concerned about the potential rising of prices that could possibly foster economic and
political instability. 59 Inside of this theory comes one of the proposals for using price
controls, as a way to reduce inflationary expectations over a certain period of time; it is
the belief that price controls would “directly” reduce inflationary expectations and
therefore lead to a lower rate of inflation, although it has been demonstrated that price
controls do not work. Expectations are also prevalent in a society such as Argentina
where if individuals consider the current rate of inflation to be high, then they also expect
high future rates of inflation.60 This can be seen in the current situation in the
government; the rate of inflation has been increasing steadily since Macri’s time in office,
which has led citizens to believe that there again is the possibility of hyperinflation,
which is something they want to avoid. History’s role in expectations can take one of two
routes in Argentina; either the urban consumers will be extremely worried about high
inflation because of rising costs in the past, or the rural constituents will be more
concerned because of how recent history has caused the President to enact economic
policies that have accommodated the avoidance of high prices for urban consumers,

59 Scheve, Kenneth. "Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking." International

Organization 58, no. 01 (2004): 1-34. doi:10.1017/s0020818304581018. 14.
60 Jonung, 141.
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while harming the rural producers with low domestic prices. It is my belief that in
Argentina, the latter of the two will be more prevalent.
The question then arises as to who is more inflation averse in a country where
everyone has been harmed by inflation in some way. From a historic perspective and as
stated above, countries with consumers who have been exposed to high levels of inflation
are typically more inflation averse and if the relative proportion of individuals has been
more exposed to the costs of inflation, the more inflation averse they will be. Although
there is an alternative argument presented that countries, which have experienced
substantial inflation in the past, are no longer concerned about it because the government
has developed a way to combat it, this is obviously not the case in Argentina because the
government has repeatedly used price controls and failed. However, what I believe is
present is that the urban constituents are no longer as concerned about inflation because
the way that the government has chosen to combat inflation and rising food prices,
through the use of price controls, has shifted the burden of inflation from urban
consumers to rural producers, making the rural constituents more concerned with
inflation.
Rising and volatile is more costly politically than even a steadily increasing
inflation rate, so the public places a much greater concern for low inflation as prices
increase rapidly. 61 A study done on public inflation aversion has also suggested that
different political parties have different attitudes towards inflation, and their findings
show that political conservatives tend to be more inflation averse than people who
identify as more politically liberal. It has been found that right-wing conservative parties

61 Scheve, 5.
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tend to pursue low inflation at the cost of jobs and economic growth, while left wing
parties tend to prioritize economic growth and jobs at the cost of a higher inflation rate. 62
Members of the conservative party are also more likely to choose economic paths
that appeal to business and financial districts, because the financial sector also has a
strong preference for price stability; many financial districts are located in urban areas,
the biggest financial district of Argentina is located in Buenos Aires. 63 It has been shown
that politicians use price controls to target certain political constituencies, so it is possible
that President Macri implemented price controls as a way to appease his constituents in
the financial sectors of Buenos Aires and other large cities. 64 Considering that he is a
member of a conservative party and was once also a businessman himself, and since the
macroeconomic policies of many people are often believed to reflect the political
coalitions that they identify with, the theory of urban bias may also explain his actions in
this respect.
Following the tumultuous history that Argentina has had with inflation along with
the attitude of the most recent Presidents towards the agricultural sector during times of
hyperinflation, it is not difficult to understand that there could be a particular bias
towards the urban sector. The implementation of price controls during the recent times of
inflation is an example of how President Macri is attempting to shift this burden of
inflation from his urban consumers to the rural producers. It is evident that not everyone
is able to benefit from either high or low inflation, there have to be winners and losers
with each one; historically in Argentina during times of high inflation, the agricultural
rural producers become the losers, which may have caused them to become much more
62 Kaplan, 77.
63 Scheve, 6.
64 Kaplan, 103.
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concerned about inflation that the urban consumers, whose issue with high prices has
been acknowledged much more in recent history than the ability of the farmers to
compete in global markets, as we saw with Nestor Kirchner and the discontinuation of
beef exports in 2006. Many criticisms of high inflation come from unions, public
enterprises, and private entrepreneurs, the majority of which are located in the urban
sector; however, there are rarely complaints from the agricultural sector about high
inflation because the price of their products increase, meaning they have the potential to
make more money. 65
However, President Macri, in order to appease his urban constituents who are
typically the losers under high inflation, shifts this burden using price controls to stabilize
the volatile prices and set them lower than international market price, which in turn
benefits the consumers from rising prices and harms the producers and turns them into
the losers from inflation. In reference to the alternative argument which states that
citizens of countries that have experienced inflation in the past no longer worry about the
effects of high inflation it because their respective government has found a way to
combat it, it may be quite possible that many urban constituents no longer view inflation
as a major problem because they know that the economic path to combat inflation will be
geared towards their desires—which is a different way of stating that the burden of
inflation will be shifted away from them.
Methods to Combat Inflation: Presidential Perspectives
Different Presidents of Argentina have attempted to combat inflation in a variety
of ways. The convertibility plan in 1991 that was discussed above was a temporary

65 Kaplan, 229.
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solution, but was combined with other bad economic policies that ultimately led to the
crash in 2001. However, this experience from Menem did show that in Argentina a lower
rate of inflation does lead to a higher approval rating. When Carlos Menem became
President and began to favor the urban sector over the rural sector, he implemented
different export tariffs to try and lower the rate, but ultimately his failure to do so led to
his administration tampering with national inflation statistics from the National Institute
for Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Censos), better known as the
INDEC. During a period of high inflation in 2006the government infringed on the
technical autonomy of the INDEC and he technicians that had previously been in charge
of estimating the CPI to gauge inflation rates were fired and replaced with technicians
chosen by the administration. The INDEC then began to release a distorted inflation
index that was much lower than what provincial governments and private agencies were
reporting, which can be seen in Figure 6 in the Appendix. Private sector economists
estimate that the inflation rate during this time was 2-3 times higher than what was
reported by the INDEC. 66
Although Cristina Kirchner did not stop the false reports of inflation rates when
she became President in 2007, she tested the public’s inflation aversion through an
increase energy and transportation subsidies, higher social spending and public
employment, and a 25% hike in the minimum wage; notice that many of the policies she
implemented appealed to mainly urban constituents and allowed some sort of business
cycle to return to Argentina.67 The tool she used to combat inflation after testing the
public’s inflation aversion is what we are most interested in.
66 Ardanaz, Martin, M. Victoria Murillo, and Pablo M. Pinto, 417.
67 Kaplan, 55.

36

In 2013, Cristina Kirchner created the program called Precios Cuidados, or
Protected Prices. This was a list of around 100 products that were given a ceiling price
that they could be sold at; many of these goods included things like bread, meat, juices,
all items that were produced agriculturally. “Son precios que permiten asegurar
condiciones de competitividad en la economía, cuidar el bolsillo de la población
argentina y que cada consumidor ejerza su derecho de elegir informado”. 68 This states
that these prices are ones that ensure competitive conditions in the economy but also
protect the bag of the Argentine consumer and give each consumer the right to choose his
or her product. When this program was implemented it was though to be successful, but it
was soon realized that this program was nothing more than another failed attempt to use
price controls. Inflation in Argentina only continued to increase and the program was
repealed in 2015.
When President Macri was running his campaign, one of his promises was that he
would finally stabilize the economy and get rid of the high levels of inflation and
corruption that had plagued the country. He also promised to not enact any of the policies
that were in place under either of the Kirchner administrations, because he is of a
different party and did not want to be viewed as corrupt as they were. So when he
announced that he would be reenacting Cristina’s Precios Cuidados program and adding
over 400 more items, it is easy to see why producers were shocked. If it is a program that
his predecessor created that he did not want to be related with, and he also saw it fail in
2015, just a year earlier when he was mayor of Buenos Aires, then there should not be
any reason to reenact it. However, this is a program that is more or less only beneficial to
68 Henríquez, Gonzalo. "Plataforma de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SAN)." Argentina: Programa Precios Cuidados.
http://plataformacelac.org/es/programa/964.
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urban citizens, which is one of the main political bases for Mauricio Macri and his party.
The increase in the program that created low prices on consumer goods was a way
President Macri could please the urban constituency and also continue to increase the
level of urban bias that has been growing for over a decade, and the implementation of a
price protection program that has been used before can be used as an example as one of
the reasons why the rural producers may be more concerned with high inflation; this is a
program that has harmed the producers before during times of high inflation, and now is
being brought back and will help the large urban coalition regain a steady price on
agricultural goods at the cost of the profits of the rural producers.
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Chapter 6:
Political Economy Theory of Price Controls
Price controls as a way to curb inflation have been used in many different
countries in Latin America since the end of the second World War. For example,
different heterodox programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru have all experienced
politicians attempting to use price and wage controls in oder to tame inflation while also
attempting to maintain an expansionary economic policy, which is what Macri has been
trying to do in Argentina during 2016 and the beginning of 2017. However, in the past all
of these programs were ultimately unstable and only further worsened the state of the
economy, and multiple times provoked different economic crises. The question that we
have been trying to answer through this thesis and will continue to answer is, why would
a President enact a program that has historically always failed?
As we have seen from the review of urban bias and the history of price controls
and inflation in Argentina, the idea that President Macri has re-enacted the Price
Protection Program of former President Cristina Kirchner in order to appease his urban
constituents is extremely plausible. His actions and policies he has implemented can be
explained by the theory of urban bias that has been presented, and is using price controls
on goods produced by rural citizens of Argentina in order to shift the burden of high
inflation in the country away from the metropolitan area and to the producers in the rural
periphery. As President and as someone who has been involved in politics for close to a
decade, Macri should be more aware of the problems that inflation causes the urban
constituents because of his proximity to them both politically and geographically, and
since economic policies have been enacted in the past decade that have been catered
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towards the urban constituents by different presidents, inflation is now going to become a
bigger concern for the rural constituents because the burden is shifted towards them.
Urban bias results in significant food subsidies for the urban poor, which in turn
also gives and advantage to the wealthy urban citizens. Food subsidies are financial aid
given to a certain niche, whether it be an industry, farmers, or consumers, in order to
make food available to the poor. Following the theory of urban bias, the niche that would
be given preference from certain food subsidies, such as price controls that lower the cost
of food and benefit consumers, would be the urban poor. Consequently, this is at the
expense of rural producers, who are forced to sell their products at lower than market
prices in order to protect the consumers. 69 However, what is more important to examine
is how Presidents are able to follow through with programs that harm a majority of the
rural agricultural producers in a country , such as urban bias does. In the case of
Argentina, there are many different manners in which both Presidents Kirchner—both
Nestor and Cristina—and current President Macri could alleviate the burden of inflation
from their urban coalition and defer it to the periphery.
The first way urban bias is achieved by President Macri is because of his
proximity to his urban constituency. The capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires, is home not
only to the Casa Rosada, where the President resides, but is also the largest metropolitan
area in the country, la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (abbreviated CABA) and is
home to over two million urban residents. Prior to being President of Argentina, Macri
was a former wealthy businessman and also mayor of Buenos Aires, meaning that he has

69 See Ballard-Rosa.
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many ties to the metropolis. Obviously, the government is going to put more effort into
mitigating the problems of the citizens located more closely to the capital.
Business networks can also have a considerable amount of influence on the
government; they can pressure the government through different business associations,
policy networks, cabinet appointments, or even through different lobbying and campaign
contributions depending on the laws in the country regarding campaigning. 70 Given
Macri’s business background in Buenos Aires, influence on the government through
different financial businesses in the urban area would not be completely unfathomable.
Many people who are involved in business are conservative in ideology, which Macri is
as well, and referring back to information observed by Scheve, conservatives and people
who are involved in the financial district tend to be more inflation averse and on the
Phillip’s curve prefer low inflation to unemployment because of the manner in which
high inflation affects their businesses in terms of rising uncertainty, rising costs of goods,
and during times of high inflation a negative effect on the firms profits. 71 This is one of
the biggest economic paradoxes that has faced Argentina for decades. Since the majority
of his political constituency is located in one large area, the probability for them to have a
greater pull in the political realm and lobby for their interests of lower inflation is greatly
increased.
This urban constituency does not go unnoticed by people located in the periphery
Argentina either; in 2012, a majority of the Macristas—people who were members of
Macri’s political party—were concentrated in urban areas. Following a map which shows
how Argentine citizens voted in the presidential election of 2015, Macri won the Ciudad
70 Kaplan, 64.
71 Scheve, 6.
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Autónoma of Buenos Aires (CABA), the largest metropolitan area in the country, which
shows that this concentration has not changed much, if at all, which only further adds to
the probability that Macri is biased towards the urban metropolis. 72 To show the attitude
of many Argentines, a survey done by the Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública—or the
Center for Public Opinion Studies—in November of 2016, eleven months after Macri
became President, asked the question “Which is the sector that has benefitted the most
during these 11 months of government?” with response options of the upper class, the
middle class, the lower class, or all benefit equally. From the 1200 respondents from
different areas around the country, the survey showed that 65% of these participants
believed that Macri governed for the upper class, and that his policies benefitted them the
most. 73
While this thesis is not concerned with the divide between rich and poor but rather
rural versus urban, there are a few things we can discern from this statistic. Similar to
many other countries, a majority of wealthy, upper class citizens are located in urban
areas. And while inflation does hurt the poor and the rich and the argument can be made
that there is an abundance of urban poverty, the reason that urban bias is still present is
because the urban poor have a much closer proximity to the President and the capital, and
therefore can make themselves heard, while the poorer voters in the periphery who are
producers have no way of making their voices heard by the President because they are so
far away. This is characterized in the following example: “if a rural farmer needs to walk
several miles just to reach his/her nearest neighbor, but an urban citizens lives with in and
72 "Elecciones 2015: mapa interactivo de resultados del ballottage por provincia, por municipio y por comuna." LA NACION.

November 22, 2015. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1846694-elecciones-2015-mapa-de-resultados-del-ballottage-por-provinciamunicipio-y-comuna.
73 LARED21. "Para el 65% de los argentinos Macri gobierna para los ricos." LARED21. November 21, 2016.
http://www.lr21.com.uy/mundo/1312729-argentina-encuesta-macri-gobierno-economia-ricos.
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works within a few feet of fellow protestors, suggests the relative threat of civil
opposition to a regime should be much greater in urban areas”. 74
Not only do urban and rural constituents differ in their separation from the capital,
but they have completely different needs from each policy that is enacted by the
government. For the urban consumers who have little way of producing their own food
besides buying it, the overriding concern in many of the large cities is the concern for
cheap food, which is something that is unavailable under times of volatile inflation or
times of hyperinflation, something that Argentine constituents are all too familiar with.
Inflation in the late 2000s caused the creation of a black market for currency.
The actions of not only President Macri, but the government as a whole, could
possibly be explained by the theory of urban bias. Right now in the Senate and House of
Deputies in Argentina, the majority of people in these positions of power are members of
the Peronist Party, the majority belonging to Alianza Frente para la Victoria or Frente
para la Victoria (AFPV and FPV), or are supporters of Cristina Kirchner and her policies.
As we have discovered from previous sections, Peronists are typically supported by the
urban coalition, and both Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Kirchner were much more biased
towards the urban sector as well. Therefore, the implementation of price controls to
support the urban coalition may not only have been to please Macri’s constituents, but
also the constituents under the Senators and Deputies.
A different manner in which we can determine if urban bias was a determinant of
the use of the Price Protection Program is through the location of each company that has
price controls placed on its products. The companies are spread out through different

74 See Ballard-Rosa.
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provinces in Argentina, and many of them are located in the more rural areas of the
country. Although there are sixteen total companies that are located in the large cities of
the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires and in Rosario in the province of Santa Fe, the
majority are located in rural areas, because that is where the most fertile land is for
farming, especially in the Pampas region. The companies that are located in those two
urban centers are mostly non-agricultural companies that are import competing, and it
can be argued that these specific companies were placed under the price controls in order
to keep their prices from rising to try and compete in the foreign market as well.
The types of products that were placed under price controls are predominantly
produced in rural regions of Argentina, and while there are some products under the
Program that are manufactured and not agriculturally grown, the price controls on these
products still harm the producers in the rural area where the company is located.
However, the majority of the products under the Price Protection Program are agricultural
goods such as meat, different bread products, juices, milk and dairy items, along with
other different products who all require an expansive farming community in order to
create their merchandise; therefore, the price controls are still aimed and placing the
burden on the companies and producers who are located in the rural areas. We can see in
the map below the distribution of the companies throughout the country in Figure 5.
As I mentioned earlier, there are some problems that arise from the original theory
of urban bias. One of the most discussed problems is that many of the countries that have
been studied and have been found to contain urban bias are not democratic regimes but
autocratic, and that democratic regimes are typically biased towards the rural periphery,
such as the United States. The other argument against this is that the likelihood that
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citizens will riot or overthrow a government is less in a democratic government—because
there are so many different levels—and more probably in an autocratic one, because it is
only one person that has power. However, Argentina has proven to be one of the most
contentious democratic countries in the world, with the highest rate of protests and riots
in Latin America. Historically, Argentina protests in the major urban cities because that is
where the politicians are located and the citizens know their concerns will be heard there.
75

In autocratic regimes, the absence of a legitimate government is what leads to
social unrest and the express of dissent from citizens through violent revolutions and
movements. In a democratic society such as the United States, there has not been a
violent revolution against the government since the Revolutionary War in 1776. In
Argentina, the country went through 5 different Presidents between 2001 and 2002
because of the amount of protests and social unrest that the citizens held in response to
the high rates of inflation. Many of these violent protests took place in the capital city and
in major urban areas, which were noticed by the Presidents at the time. This also makes
sense because citizens who reside in urban areas tend to express a lower level of
satisfaction than those who live in smaller cities and rural areas, and therefore have more
reason to protest. 76
Urban bias is present in Argentina even though it is a democratic regime because
the amount of people who can conglomerate in the metropolitan areas and rebel against
the government is much larger than the amount of people who can loot and riot in the
streets in the rural peripheral regions. A riot in front of the capital urban city of Buenos
75 See Ballard-Rosa.
76 "LAPOP." LAPOP . http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.
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Aires is much more noticeable than one in the province of Jujuy. Even Nestor Kirchner
was aware of the power of the piqueteros, which comes from the word “to picket”, and
protested by gathering in huge numbers to have rallies that would block of streets,
sections of cities, or businesses and government buildings; he would use them as factors
of intimidation. The power of protest is no small ordeal in Argentina. The other main
problem presented with the urban bias theory are those of determining what is perceived
as urban and rural, but this is addressed in the methodology section with the specific
variable that is used for size.
There are many different ways to measure whether or not the theory of urban bias
can be used to explain the implementation of price controls in Argentina, some of which
have been measured through research in this section. In the next section, I will conduct an
empirical analysis to determine whether my hypothesis that rural constituents are more
concerned with inflation overall is correct. I suspect this because of the policies that the
past two Presidents have enacted in order to appease the strong urban coalition through
the implementation of price controls to reduce the price of agricultural goods, which has
therefore led to a shift in the burden of inflation from the urban consumers to the rural
producers who now receive most of the impact of high inflation.
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Chapter 7:
Empirical analysis
The historical analysis of inflation and price controls in Argentina combined with
the relationship of the government to its urban and rural constituents has given a certain
amount of insight into whether or not urban bias has been present in the past decade. The
economic policies that have been implemented suggest that urban bias has played a role,
but a statistical analysis also needs to be done to corroborate the historical analysis. In
order to test that price controls can be explained by urban bias, I will conduct two
analyses: one that pertains to public opinion on inflation data, because the level of
concern that certain citizens have about inflation will help to explain whether or not the
price controls were enacted for their benefit or to their disadvantage. The second analysis
will determine whether or not the population density of the city or town that each
company that had price controls placed on their products can be explained by urban bias,
the hypothesis following that places with lower population densities will have a higher
amount of companies with price controls located within them.
This section will be divided into two different sub-sections. The first section will
be an analysis of data gathered from a public opinion survey done in Argentina in 2014 to
assess different attitudes concerning problems in the country in relation to the
respondents personal life in the economic, political, and social realms. This is important
because it will demonstrate how constituents in different areas of the country—with
differences in size of city, age, occupation and education—view inflation in Argentina,
and we will be most interested in seeing how rural citizens view inflation; if it is seen as
more of a problem in rural areas than urban ares, this could mean that through the
policies enacted to combat inflation and appease members of the urban constituency,
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rural constituents have been harmed the most and therefore view times of high inflation
as a greater problem than those in the urban areas, because the urban constituency knows
that their concerns will be taken care of by the government.
The second section will contain data from the companies who have products
under price control in order to show that the locations of each company coincide with the
theory of urban bias that has been examined previously. We will return to the theory of
urban bias from a business viewpoint rather than from a singular respondents view will
also examine the importance of location of the different businesses that have price
controls. This is important because if there are more companies located in areas with a
small populations and population densities, we will be able to verify whether or not these
companies were selected specifically because of their rural attributes, which would
coincide with the theory of urban bias.
Section I: Public Opinion
The first section will consider public opinion data in order to gain an accurate
perception of how inflation is viewed throughout the country. The data used in this part is
derived from a few different sources. First, I used data from a study done at Vanderbilt
University concerning different problems that were facing Argentines in the year 2014,
with data concerning employment, gender, level of education, political ideology, age,
monthly household income, the size of where the respondent lives, and whether or not the
respondent believes inflation is the most important problem concerning the country of
Argentina.
The variable of monthly household income, labeled “q10new”, ranges from
“ningún ingreso” or “no income” to “más de 9900” or “more than 9900” pesos per
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month. The variable for years of education, labeled ed, ranges from 0 to 18+, the variable
age, labeled “q2”, ranges from 16 to 88. The ideological variable which is labeled “l1”, is
ranked on a scale from Izquierda or 0, to Derecha or 10, which means the scale proceeds
from the most liberal to the most conservative. Gender, which is labeled the same, is
registered as “0” for male and “1” for female. The variable that represents the size of
where the person lives, labeled “tamano” or size, ranges from “Capital Nacional (área
metropolitana)” to “Área rural”, which means that it is coded as 0 representing a large
metropolitan area and 5 representing the most rural areas in the country.
I recoded the variable of employment as well as the variable that concerned
whether inflation was the biggest problem that faced the country. The variable of
employment, labeled “employment” was changed from different levels of employment—
if the person was searching, was in a part time or full time job—to simply employed or
unemployed, and the variable that asked if inflation was the biggest problem or not was
recoded from a variable that listed different problems facing the country to a variable that
simply listed inflation as the biggest problem, or other. This was done in order to simplify
the process and to assure that all of the variables used are relevant to the research.
The first hypothesis that will be examined in this analysis as it relates to urban
bias is as follows: as the size of the place where the respondent is located grows smaller
in size, the tendency to view inflation as the largest problem for the country will increase.
I suspect that this will be caused by previous experiences that rural constituents have had
with inflation, which is that the urban constituents are more favored during times of high
inflation—in their desire for lower prices—and in turn do not see inflation as a problem
anymore because of the recent price control program which has lowered the price of

49

agricultural goods, while the needs of rural constituents—many of who are producers—
during times of inflation have been ignored, since they are the ones who benefit from
inflationary prices because it makes their products more competitive in the international
market.
The dependent variable in this analysis will be the variable “inflation”, which asks
“Is inflation the most important problem?” which has responses of “other” or “inflation”,
coded 0 and 1 respectively, while the independent variable is “tamano”, described above.
Originally, I was going to use a variable that was only urban and rural, but thought it
better to use “tamano” because it was a more specific measure of what counted as rural or
urban and gave a better view as to how the size of the city affected the view of inflation.
Size of Area Lived In

Frequency

Percent

National Capital (metropolitan
area)

126

8.3

Big city

163

10.8

Medium sized city

323

21.4

Small city

720

47.6

Rural area

180

11.9

1512

100

Total

We can see from the frequency distribution that a majority of these respondents have
identified themselves as being from a “cuidad pequeña”, which is a small city, and it
constitutes almost half of the responses at 47.6%. It also shows that the smallest number
of respondents came from the metropolitan area, at only 8.3% of the respondents, so this
may bias the results towards the smaller cities because there are more respondents from
that area.
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The equation that we will be using to run the regression for these two variables is
as follows:
inflation = a + b(tamano)
Where a is the constant and inflation and tamano represent the two variables. After
running the two variables we arrive with these statistics, which will be explained below.
Variables in equation

B

Sig.

Tamano (size)
Constant

Exp(B)

0.240

0.000

1.271

-2.361

0.000

0.094

The equation from above now becomes:
inflation = -2.361 + .240
The regression was tested at a 90% confidence interval, which means that anything under
.10 is statistically significant, which we can find in the column labeled Sig. Since the
significance of both the independent variable in relation to the dependent variable was
.000 this means that the relationship between the two is statistically significant.
Furthermore, the column labeled Exp(B) identifies the odds ratio between the two
variables, and indicates how much the odds of the dependent variable change for each
increase in the independent variable. So, since the Exp(B) value is greater than 1, this
means that the odds of the dependent variable increase as the independent variable
increases. Therefore, since the size of the town starts from 0 at the largest city and goes to
5 as a small rural town, this means as the size of the residence gets smaller, the likelihood
that the person believes inflation is the largest problem facing the country increases,
which proves my hypothesis to a certain extent.
However, it is important to note that there are no controlling variables in this first
regression, which means that there could be other unidentified variables that also have an
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influence on whether or not inflation is a priority. Control variables are also important in
order to relieve some of the bias present from the amount of respondents in the small city
category. So, in this next regression to test the same hypothesis as above, we will add
independent control variables of education, gender, monthly household income,
employment, age, and political ideology along with keeping “tamano” as the main control
variable in order to validate the regression and achieve more accurate results.
From Figure 3, we can see that the number of employed respondents is greater
than the number of unemployed respondents, and we can also see that there is a variety in
the ages of respondents, with the youngest being 16 years old and the oldest being 88, so
it will be interesting to see what kind of effect this has on their attitudes towards inflation.
The other distributions located in the following Appendices are that of the monthly
household income, which shows the ranges that are used, and the number of male and
female respondents.
The distribution of the political ideology variable is particularly interesting. We
can see from the histogram below that it is a bell curve that is not skewed, with most
people identifying as politically moderate, or 5 on the scale, which can be found below.
This shows that there may be a general consensus among Argentines that political
affiliation may not be as important in determining certain situations. I believe that the
regression will show that political ideology does not play as important of a role in
determining whether or not inflation is the greatest issue because the majority of
respondents identified themselves as moderate rather than radical.
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With the addition of these control variables, the equation now becomes:
inflation = a + b1(employment) + b2(gender) + b3(q2) + b4(l1) + b5(ed) + b6(q10new) +
b7(tamano)
where inflation equals the constant plus the control variables of employment, gender, age,
political ideology, years of education, monthly household income, and size of city from
the previous regression and when we run the regression, we achieve the following results:
Variable in equation

B

Sig.

Employment

0.005

0.980

Gender

0.012

0.953

Age (q2)

-0.011

0.105

Ideology (l1)

-0.037

0.406

Education (ed)

-0.059

0.050

Monthly household income
(q10new)

-0.009

0.702

0.284

0.007

-1.174

0.109

Size of area lived in (tamano)
Constant
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From this table we are able to come to a number of different conclusions concerning the
variables and how they relate to the problem of inflation as it is viewed in Argentina. The
regression was still run at a 90% confidence interval, so any variable in the section
labeled Sig. that is below .1 means that it is significant in determining whether or not the
respondents believe that inflation is the biggest problem facing the country. We can see
from the chart that employment, gender, age, political ideology, and household income
are all not statistically significant because they are above the .1 value.
However, the variables of education and size of city (tamano) are both below .1,
with respective measures of .050 and .007, which means that including these variables as
predictors significantly enhances the probability that the respondent will view inflation as
the largest issue in the country. So, as the respondent increases in years of education, the
likelihood that they will view inflation as the largest problem decreases. It has been
studied in many different societies and especially in third world countries that a majority
of the people who are educated or who are able to obtain higher levels of education reside
in urban areas because there is more opportunity and more availability to achieve a higher
degree of learning, while many people in rural areas are unable to do so simply because
their proximity to the nearest school is too far for a child to walk. Many times children
who live in rural areas also have to leave school in order to help their families with farm
work or other household work. The fact that there is a statistically negative relationship
between level of education and consideration of inflation as the largest issue, meaning
that as the years of education increase, the probability that inflation will be viewed as the
largest problem decreases, coincides with the hypothesis that I have attempted to prove.
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While the significance of the variable tamano did change from .000 to .007 with
the addition of the control variables, there is still a statistically significant relationship
between the independent and dependent variables. This slight increase shows that even
when we control for many other factors that may or may not influence the dependent
variable, the size of the city where the respondent lives is still extremely significant. We
can also examine the Exp(B) column and find that the measure here is 1.329. Since this
number is greater than one, this means that there is a positive relationship between the
two variables; as the size of the city gets smaller, the probability that the individual will
see inflation as the most important concern increases.
From the results of these two empirical analyses we can come to a few different
conclusions. The results from each analysis show that the hypothesis considered in this
first part of the section—as the size of the place where the respondent is located grows
smaller in size, the tendency to view inflation as the largest problem for the country will
increase—is supported, because each test ran gave a significant result under the variable
“tamano”. This means that the respondents who were located in the smaller areas had a
larger concern of inflation in the country, caused by policies that had been enacted that
shifted the burden of inflation from the urban constituents to the rural periphery, and can
be explained by the theory of urban bias. However, I was surprised to discover the role of
the variables of employment and monthly household income were not significant,
although I believed they would be.
In association with the first test, although the regression showed that the size of
the area lived in was significant in regards to how it affected inflation was viewed there
are certain limitations. The most important limitation to this regression is there were no
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other variables included in the analysis to control for outlying factors, and therefore could
have produced a biased result. However, this was controlled for in the second regression
when the control variables were added, and we still achieved a result that was significant
in determining that size of area was related to how inflation was viewed to the
respondent. It is also important to emphasize the fact that when the analysis was
controlled for household income, the result that rural was still more concerned with
inflation held, and income did not play a significant role in determining whether or not
inflation was the largest problem, which means that how concerned a person is with
inflation does not depend on how much money they make per month, which reinforces
the fact that this is not an argument of rich versus poor but rather urban versus rural.
Yet, there are some data-related constraints to this regression even though it
contains control variables. First, the data is from the year 2014, when Mauricio Macri had
not yet been elected President and Cristina Kirchner was still in power; this could have
affected the views of the respondents on what problem was most significant to them in
regards to what was occurring in the country at the time of the poll and whether or not
inflation had been a concern that year; if the poll had been done at a more recent date, it
could have shown either a greater or lesser concern with inflation and therefore changed
the results of the analysis. There is also a greater number of respondents who live in rural
areas than the urban areas, which also could have misconstrued the results.
Section II: Companies
The rationale behind the second empirical test that will be run is to examine
whether or not the companies that have products with price controls on them are located
in rural areas of the country. If a company is located in a rural area and a majority of its
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products are produced agriculturally, this could also be explained by the theory of urban
bias; these companies would have very little say if their products are placed under price
controls because they are located further away from the capital. Furthermore, the
companies being located in rural areas and not urban areas would mean that Macri would
not want to harm the companies and his constituents in urban areas by placing their
products under price controls, but would still place price controls on companies in rural
areas and harm the rural producers.
The second analysis that will be run is a linear regression, which evaluates causal
relationships, to gauge if there is a relationship between the cities that have businesses
with price controls on them and whether or not they are a product of this urban bias as
well. For the dependent variable for this regression, I used a variable that I created, which
was the number of companies for that specific department that had a price control on
them, divided by the population of that department, with information gathered from the
INDEC. 77 As my independent variable for the first test, I used the population density of
each department. The hypothesis that I will be testing is that as the number of companies
per department increases, the population density of that department will decrease. The
null hypothesis would stand as there is no relationship between these two variables. The
equation is as follows:
companies w/ price controls = a + v4(popdens)
When we run the linear regression, we receive the following results:

77 "Argentina." Argentina: provincias, departamentos, partidos, ciudades y localidades - población y mapas.

https://www.citypopulation.de/Argentina_s.html.
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Variable in equation

B

Sig

Constant
Pop. Dens. (v4)

5.243E-06

0.000

-2.815E-10

0.738

From these results, the equation now becomes :
companies w/ price controls = 5.24E-6 - 2.815E-10
By using the column labeled Sig., as we did in the previous tests, we are able to see that
there is no significant correlation between the population density and the number of firms
that have price controls on them, since the value is .738 and more than .1.
However, in this test there was only one independent variable to control for
random responses or correlations. In the next linear regression, I will add a control
variable that represents the percentage of votes that President Macri received in the 2015
election in order to gauge the kind of representation and support that he had throughout
the country when he was elected President. The different percentage of votes that he
received for each department in each province of Argentina is important because it
enables us to see how the rural departments voted in relation to the urban departments
and whether or not the population density of the department and whether it was
considered urban or rural was related to the amount of votes that gathered in each. The
addition of this variable is also important because a department that is historically rural
would probably not be inclined to vote for someone who has historically been linked to
business and not agriculture. This information was gathered from an independent
newspaper in Argentina.
When using these two variables, the equation is:
companies w/ price controls = a + v4(popdens) + v7(percentvotes)
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The same hypothesis as above is being tested, and I believe will give a more accurate
result as to whether or not this information can be explained by the theory of urban bias.
Variable in equation

B

Sig

Constant

5.280E-06

0.000

Pop. Dens. (v4)

-2.820E-10

0.737

Percent of Votes (v6)

-6.682E-10

0.902

With the addition of the control variable, the equation is:
companies w/ price controls = 5.820E-6 - 2.82-E-10 - 6.682E-20
We can see from the Sig. column once again that the hypothesis is not supported through
this analysis. This means the hypothesis stated above, that companies with price controls
on them will increase in an area that has a lower population density, is proven wrong and
therefore does not support the theory that urban bias can be used as an explanation as to
why these companies were chosen.
From these two analyses we can conclude that there is not a relationship between
the population density of the department and the number of firms that contain price
controls on them, which means that there is a chance that the locations of each company
were chosen randomly, or some just happened to be in rural areas. Therefore, the theory
of urban bias cannot be used for this section of the analysis to explain whether or not
Macri was attempting to give an advantage to his constituents in the metropolitan area.
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Chapter 8:
Conclusion
Following the discussion of the history of price controls and inflation in Argentina
combined with an empirical analyses of certain sociopolitical and economic
characteristics and the businesses under price controls, the results remain ambiguous as to
whether or not urban bias was truly the reasoning behind the implementation of price
controls. However, there were a few limitations to this thesis. The first limitation was
simply the lack of some important information about the different departments in
Argentina; the data used for population and population density was from a 2014 census,
and although that may not have had a dramatic effect the results, it could have had a
certain effect. It may have been better to use city level data rather than department level
data, but for many of the rural towns in Argentina there had not been information after
the year 2001, which would not have been an accurate representation of the population.
Another limitation to this analysis is that originally I would have liked to use data
pertaining to whether or not the citizens were against the use of price controls, but this
particular data was not available, so I believed that their concerns about inflation would
be able to at least partially explain their attitudes towards price controls.
Another limitation to this thesis relates to the analysis between the companies and
the population density. Ideally, population density would have been a control variable
and the number of companies per town or city in Argentina would have been used to
compare the ratio between the number of companies that have products with price
controls and the number of companies per town or city overall, but again this data was
unavailable.
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If I had more time, I would have liked to conduct my own investigation of citizens
in Argentina from this current year, as the data from the Vanderbilt study was done in
2014 when Cristina Kirchner was still President; the attitudes of certain residents of
urban and rural areas may have been different under Kirchner and Macri. Something that
may call for further analysis is the reasoning as to why people voted for Macri, for
example, if they voted for him because they believed in his vision, or if they simply
wanted a change from the Peronism and Kirchnersm that had ruled them for over a
decade. There is also the possibility for a cross-national study because it would be less
generalizable than just Argentina, since Argentina has such a high percentage of urban
voters. It would be interesting to see if the theory of urban bias can also be used to
explain why other countries have used price controls, especially if they have a lower
percentage of an urban population than Argentina. Another study could be done on
whether or not the rural coalition has revolted against the policies that have put them at a
disadvantage in terms of profit and their level of competitiveness in the international
market, and whether or not it had any effect on the policies of the government.
However, there are certain implications that we can derive from the results from
the public opinion analyses. We can see that there is a significant relationship between
the size of the city that a person is located in and their level of education along in relation
to their concern about inflation in the country, since the analysis done in this thesis
showed that as the level of education decreased, the person’s concern of inflation as the
biggest problem in the country increased. This may call for further analysis in Argentina
to see if there is a large education gap between rural and urban constituents, and how this
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education gap may affect their concerns about the country in both an economic and
political sense.
We can see that certain economic approaches may worry some constituents who
have been subjected to policies such as price controls previously. This analysis shows
that Argentine citizens who live in smaller towns and have been harmed by price controls
realize that their politicians may not always be acting in their best interests. This is a
cause for concern especially when the steps that the government takes to appease the
urban constituency harms the livelihood of the rural producers, such as the price controls
on agricultural products do. The government of Argentina needs to realize, as the rest of
the world has, that price controls are not a sufficient manner in which inflation can be
controlled, and they need to adopt a policy that is less harmful to the producers of the
country, the producers that help and have helped sustain their economy.
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Chapter 9:
Appendix
Figure 1: Ideology Distribution
Ideología (izquierda / derecha)
Frequenc
y
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Percent
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4.7
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1.9

6.6

3
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5.0

6.6

13.2
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22.1
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6

135

8.9
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7
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8
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6.4
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89.5

9
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1.9

2.4
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6.1
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100.0
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100.0
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100.0
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Cumulative
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Figure 2: Gender Distribution
Sexo
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d

e

Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

726

48.0

48.0

48.0

Mujer

786
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Total

1512
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100.0

Figure 3: Employment Distribution

Is person employed?
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g
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Percent

Valid
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45.7
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2

.1
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Figure 4: Map of Companies
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Figure 5: Actual vs. Reported Inflation Rates
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Figure 6: Monthly Household Income
Ingreso mensual del hogar
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y
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